Highways Agency

Circumstances of the accident

2.1 It currently appears that, during the early morning of Wednesday 28 February 2001, Mr Gary Hart was driving a Land Rover County motor vehicle, which was towing a double axle trailer unit loaded with a Renault Savanna estate car, westbound on the M62 Motorway.

2.2 At around 0612 hrs Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and at a point prior to reaching the Little Heck Railway Bridge, Mr Hart's vehicle and loaded trailer left the carriageway to the nearside. The cause of the vehicle combination leaving the carriageway is currently unknown to the authors of this report.

2.3 Sunrise at that site on the morning of 28 February 2001 was at 0655 GMT. Therefore, it was dark at the time of the accident.

2.4 The first point of contact between the Land Rover and the kerb on the nearside edge of the westbound carriageway has been identified as being 50.2 metres from the safety fence terminal, i.e. 50.2 metres before reaching the safety fence which is situated on the nearside verge in advance of Little Heck Bridge.

2.5 This point of contact is assumed to be have been made by the nearside front wheel of the Land Rover.

2.6 The vehicle proceeded at a shallow angle to the kerb before a second impact point was made at 23.9 metres from the safety fence terminal. This point of contact is assumed to be that of the offside front wheel of the Land Rover.

2.7 From each point of contact, rolling wheel tracks across the verge identify the subsequent course of travel.

2.8 The initial angle of the wheel tracks is between 5 and 6 degrees to the normal direction of travel along the motorway.

2.9 It is evident from the tracks that the vehicle combination continued to leave the motorway, with the offside front wheel missing the end of the safety fence terminal by approximately 7 metres (measured parallel to the carriageway edge), before it travelled down the embankment, which is approximately 3.5 metres high at this point.

2.10 The vehicle combination broke through the wooden post and rail boundary fence between the highway and adjacent private land at the base of the motorway embankment around 16.9 metres before the intersection of that fence with the similarly constructed boundary fence of the railway.

2.11 The vehicle combination continued through the boundary fence of the railway, dropped down into the railway cutting and finally came to rest fouling the East Coast Main railway line (ECML).

2.12 In all, the vehicle combination travelled approximately 100 metres between leaving the carriageway and coming to rest on the railway.

2.13 The Land Rover came to rest either immediately adjacent to, or partly within the up-line, i.e. southbound, track. It appears that, by this time, the trailer had become detached from the Land Rover and had come to rest up against the side of the Land Rover.

2.14 The precise positions of the Land Rover, trailer and Renault Savanna before the train strike is currently unknown to the authors of this report and is subject to investigation by the Police.

2.15 No other road vehicles appear to have been involved in the material accident and the only highway structures impacted were the two wooden boundary fences running perpendicular to each other at the bottom of the embankment between the highway and adjacent land.

2.16 Mr Hart survived the incident and telephoned the emergency services at approximately 0614 GMT. The impact between the high speed passenger train and the Land Rover occurred around this time.

2.17 Drawing No. 03719/106/2/001 comprises a plan showing the path of the vehicle combination in relation to pertinent features of the highway. Drawing Nos. 03719/106/2/002 and 003 provide cross sectional details through sections A-A and B-B respectively, as indicated on the plan. Drawing No. 03719/106/2/004 is a schematic drawing showing the southern side elevation of Little Heck Bridge. These drawings are included to the rear of this report.

2.18 Photographs 1 to 4, also to the rear of this report, show the general area of nearside verge, embankment and railway where the vehicle combination travelled and came to rest.

2.19 It should be noted that the vehicle rest positions shown in the drawings and photographs are the final rest positions following the impact with the train.